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Abstract 
Transparency obligations have undergone substantial transformations since the inception of the GATT 
in 1947. The paper begins by tracing the evolution of transparency principles during the WTO era. 
From an obligation to publish general laws affecting trade, the system now includes peer review by 
governments (monitoring and surveillance), and efforts to inform the public. The system is remarkable 
for what has been accomplished, but much remains to be done. Originally designed for a handful of 
developed countries, the system now provides an expanded knowledge base that benefits states, 
economic actors and citizens with inadequate resources to acquire information on their own. Fulfilling 
this emerging objective will require a stronger role for the WTO Secretariat as a “common agent” for 
Members. Transparency in the WTO is based on an assumption that agency matters. The evolution of 
the system reflects an increasingly expansive view of whose agency counts for trade policy, and 
therefore of what kinds of information should be available, in what form, and what use ought to be 
made of it. Our expectation is that the continued evolution in the multilateral understanding of agency 
in trade policy will be reflected in growing sophistication of WTO transparency practices. 
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1. The Real Jewel in the WTO Crown 
Formal rounds of negotiations and resort to the dispute settlement system are the traditional ways of 
thinking about the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but the third dimension of its work, 
which can be broadly grouped as ‘transparency and accountability mechanisms’, may be the most 
important.
 Transparency is part of the WTO’s DNA, traceable at least through the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) back to a 1923 treaty on customs cooperation. This essential 
element of WTO institutional design is intended to let sunshine illuminate trade policy practices to the 
benefit of both governments and traders. The WTO’s 20th anniversary is an appropriate moment to 
describe the impressive evolution of its transparency mechanisms, assess their effectiveness, and 
reflect on what more must be done if the WTO is to fulfil its potential as the central institution for the 
governance of the global trading system. 
The first use of sunshine as a metaphor for transparency as a policy tool is attributed to the 
American jurist Louis Brandeis. In writing about efforts to regulate finance, Brandeis (1914, 92) 
stated: 
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be 
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.  
The Brandeis view assumes that agents whose actions are exposed will hew more closely to shared 
understandings of the common good. If not, then other agents provided with information can exercise 
appropriate discipline. In this view of agency, sunlight contributes more to social order than does 
coercion. Sunlight plays this role in the trading system by reducing information asymmetries. If one of 
the points of signing trade agreements is that binding commitments reduce policy uncertainty that 
would otherwise reign over trade relations, then the credibility of those commitments matters. 
Transparency ought to improve the operation of the trading system by allowing verification by all 
Members that national law, policy, and implementation achieve the objective intended by the 
agreements.  
The assumption of the drafters of the GATT in 1947 was that publication alone was all that the 
relevant agents needed. Over time, participants in the trading system learned that a more active form 
of publication was needed to draw relevant information to the attention of other governments in the 
form of “notifications” through the Secretariat (GATT, 1978). By the 1970s, it was becoming clear 
that governments needed a forum to discuss such notification with each other and the GATT Council 
began a biannual review of notifications (WTO, 1995a). Neither that review nor the notifications 
themselves were sufficient, so as part of the establishment of the WTO as a new international 
organization, the Uruguay Round agreements created a much more elaborate structure of committees, 
with a working group on how to make the many new notification requirements work. 
Creating opportunities to discuss new measures in advance can reduce the potential for conflict 
between states, for example when the measure is modified to accommodate the interests of partners, 
but it only provides time for economic actors to adjust if the information is available to them. The 
original GATT transparency system assumed that the primary agents were government officials in 
developed countries, and traders with the sophistication to make use of published information. The 
picture changed dramatically over the years as more and more countries joined the GATT/WTO 
(expanding membership from the original 23 to today’s 160), and the amount of trade-relevant 
regulation proliferated as well. Less than 10 years after the creation of the WTO, Members had already 
concluded that more needed to be done to make information available to developing countries, the 
public and economic actors. 
In what follows, we will first examine the evolution of the discipline within the world trading 
system (Section 2), before we perform a ‘reality check’ and discuss whether the transparency 
obligations have been observed (Section 3). Next we suggest (section 4) that trade policy information 
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is a public good, especially for traders and for smaller Members, a public good that will be under-
provided without a strong role for the Secretariat. We conclude (Section 5) with two proposals on the 
optimal future evolution of the transparency obligation. 
2. One, Two and Three Generations of Transparency 
WTO transparency has evolved through three generations.
1
 First generation refers to the original 
GATT policies on information from 1947 as elaborated over the years, while second generation refers 
to the monitoring and surveillance mechanisms introduced with the conclusion of the Tokyo Round 
negotiations in 1979, and enhanced in the Uruguay Round negotiations that led to the creation of the 
WTO in 1995. Third generation refers both to managing an enlarged WTO with 160 Members, and to 
greater openness to the public, facilitated by the emergence of the internet, especially after a 2002 
decision on access to documents.  
2.1 First Generation Birth Defects 
Most of the first generation WTO transparency provisions relate to the obligations incumbent on 
governments for trade policy transparency at home. This principle is first seen in Art. X GATT on 
“Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations”, but it is now found in many other WTO 
agreements. Publication, which remains essential, proved to have at least two limitations.  
First, publication is restricted to laws of ‘general application’, which is sensible, since otherwise a 
cost will be imposed on WTO Members to provide information that might be of little use to traders. 
Disputes have arisen (and continue to arise) on what ‘general application’ means, which is one of the 
reasons that over 40 WTO disputes concern GATT Article X. WTO Members have consistently 
preferred to be parsimonious about what they publish. 
Second, the emphasis is placed on ‘unveiling’ information, somewhere. Procurement of 
information however, can be costly. Are most traders helped, for example, by information about 
subsidies published in a local newspaper that is not in a WTO official language? Publication at home 
does not mean notification to other Members of the WTO. The only significant GATT notification 
requirements were in Art. XVI, which required notification of subsidies, and Art. XXIV, which 
required notification of FTAs (GATT, 1978). 
2.2 From Publication to Notification 
Notification obligations began to expand in the 1980s as the new Tokyo Round obligations too the 
GATT “behind the border”, and expanded much more with the advent of the WTO in 1995. 
Publication at home is barely enough when most trade measures have their effects at the border, but 
much more transparency is needed when obligations concern domestic measures that can affect trade. 
To encourage submission of information, in one of the “decisions” adopted with the creation of the 
WTO (WTO, 1995b), Members agreed that notification would not prejudice views on the consistency 
of measures. They established a Central Registry of Notifications to receive and maintain 
notifications, to inform each Member annually of their regular notification obligations, and to draw the 
attention of individual Members to regular notification requirements that remain unfulfilled. By 2011, 
the central database covered 176 notification requirements, of which 42 are recurring requirements 
(semi-annual, annual, biennial, triennial) (WTO, 2011a, Box 1). This number has increased with the 
new Trade Facilitation Agreement. 
                                                     
1
 This section is based in part on (Collins-Williams and Wolfe, 2010; Wolfe, 2013). 
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Notification is one leg of second-generation obligations, the other being the establishment of 
monitoring and surveillance mechanisms. Members review each other’s implementation of the 
Agreements in the various WTO committees, often with an opportunity to ask each other questions 
about their respective notifications. The Agriculture Committee, for example, devotes a significant 
part of each regular meeting to the review of notifications. The Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements’ (CRTA) new Transparency Mechanism allows discussion of notification of new RTAs to 
expose the potentially negative aspects of an RTA without requiring Members to give it formal 
approval (Mavroidis, 2011). Peer review of the ensemble of a country’s trade policy (but not 
consideration of specific obligations) is also found in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism 
(TPRM).Discussion there is based on major reports written both by the WTO Secretariat and the 
Member under review (WTO, 2011a, para 178 ff).  
The most elaborate monitoring and surveillance mechanism is now known as the “specific trade 
concerns” (STC) procedure. That term is not mentioned in the text of any WTO agreement, although 
many agreements encourage a process where Members may engage in ad hoc “consultations”. The 
STC process has evolved the most in the SPS (Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary Measures) and TBT 
(Technical Barriers to Trade) committees Horn et al. (2013). 
2.3 Into the Great Wide Open 
Third generation transparency focuses on the efficiency of procuring information. The TBT 
Agreement is the frontrunner here. It requires the establishment of ‘inquiry points’, where private 
traders can seek information from national authorities about the workings of technical regulations. 
Traders therefore do not have to depend on their government, which will receive similar information 
in the TBT Committee. Inquiry points are the first step towards ‘single windows’ in each Member to 
reduce the “search costs” of information procurement. In similar vein, the new Integrated Trade 
Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) provides a single entry point for information compiled by the WTO on trade 
policy measures. I-TIP covers both tariff and non-tariff measures affecting trade in goods as well as 
information on trade in services, trade in government procurement markets, regional trade agreements 
and the accession commitments of WTO members. This transparency system looks good on paper, but 
does it work?  
3. Reality Check 
The evolution of the GATT/WTO through three generations of increasing complexity and 
sophistication has created a remarkable window on the trading system, but it remains cloudy. The 
Central Registry system with its detailed annual reports is both essential and frustrating, because only 
experts can make sense of the data. More valuable is the section of the periodic TPR reports on each 
country that details their notification performance. But this kind of “naming and shaming”, which also 
takes place in some committees, has not led to a large increase in notification. 
Four sorts of reasons can be advanced in explanation of why governments do not improve 
notification. The first is bureaucratic incapacity, which is the case for many developing countries 
whose trade ministries lack the data or knowledge. Second, Members might worry about opening 
themselves to criticism in a dispute, perhaps about a measure they suspect might be illegal, or worry 
that a notification might require showing one’s cards in a negotiation. Third, there is lack of trust 
between trade negotiators and other government agencies in capitals, which is said to be more 
significant than any lack of trust in Geneva. This lack of trust inhibits the ability of trade officials to 
gather information for notification of domestic policies, which are the policies where notification is 
most valuable. Fourth, there is ambiguity about what to notify. What is ‘law of general application’? 
What is a ‘subsidy’?  
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In the latest in a long series of efforts of such efforts, the chairperson of the General Council wrote 
to the chairs of all WTO bodies in February 2009 asking them “to consult with Members on ways to 
improve the timeliness and completeness of notifications and other information flows on trade 
measures.” The subsequent annual overview of the trading system by the Director-General (WTO, 
2009) contained a new section on transparency, since repeated every year. What it shows is that 
required notifications are late or incomplete, or never submitted at all. No Committee has a perfect 
record, though some are better than others. The record of notification of industrial subsidies is 
especially poor (Collins-Williams and Wolfe, 2010). While many of the poor performers are small 
countries of little overall significance in the trading system, some of the recalcitrant are among the 
largest traders. In April 2013, the chair of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
Committee listed the 71 Members that had not made 2011 notifications, including 4 of top 30 
merchandise exporters: China, Indonesia, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates.
2
 The excuses 
offered included technical and capacity constraints, and coordination difficulties.. A related problem is 
the inability or unwillingness of many Members to use second-generation transparency mechanisms 
by asking questions in committees. The nearly 900 questions asked in the SCM committee from 2008 
to 2012 were asked by only 16 Members, all but two of whom are G-20 countries, although the 
questions were posed to 58 Members (counting the EU as one in both cases). This reticence may be a 
manifestation of the “glass house syndrome”. Or if Members do not ask questions, it could be because 
they do not see the value of either notification or surveillance. 
Violations of transparency obligations are, like any other obligation, justiciable. The de facto 
system of prospective remedies that WTO Panels have adopted means that all WTO Members, that 
have failed on their obligation to disclose information have to do, is notify the WTO ex post facto. A 
highly illustrative case is the ‘Trondheim’ litigation, (Mavroidis 1993), where Norway had failed to 
respect its transparency obligations under the Government Procurement Agreement. The United States 
found out, and prevailed in the subsequent GATT dispute, but had to be content with to a ‘Pyrrhic’ 
victory. All the Panel requested from Norway was a promise never to repeat this behaviour. In 
practice, therefore, the only discipline on transparency obligations, is transparency. We think more is 
needed. 
4. Empowerment of the Common Agent 
The objective of WTO transparency is not only to reduce information asymmetries among 
governments, but also between the State, economic actors, and citizens. Article x.1 GATT requires 
publication of certain trade policy information for the benefit of both governments and traders. Article 
X.3 requires creation of independent administrative law tribunals to allow prompt adjudication of 
customs matters. More recent WTO agreements go further in specifying domestic administrative law 
requirements. While we think of the WTO as a contract among governments, therefore, its rules are 
also meant to serve traders. The rights of private parties under the Government Procurement 
Agreement (GPA), their effective protection through the obligation to establish ‘inquiry points’ under 
the TBT and SPS Agreements go in the same direction. These differing objectives create a trilemma. 
The surveillance system is designed to monitor official obligations on behalf of governments, but 
citizens and analysts are interested in the economic or social impact of policy, not the implementation 
of commitments, while traders are only served if governments publish information at home, and if all 
WTO data is accessible, in user-friendly form. Uncertainty for economic actors, including about the 
rules in foreign markets, can be crippling. In short, everyone needs more information, and they need 
efficient access to it.  
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4.1 Whose Agency? 
It is by now commonplace to treat ‘information’ as a commodity. There are undeniable search costs 
when trying to unearth information, and some agents cannot bear them. It is typically poor, developing 
countries in the WTO that profit from transparency, since procurement of information is costlier for 
them: they export few goods and services to few countries, and They lack a large diplomatic network 
of officials gathering commercial information abroad. Similarly, smaller traders lack in-house trade 
intelligence capacity, and cannot afford to procure it from big multinational law firms. Our analysis 
shows that small countries and small firms, in particular, need more from the WTO. The Secretariat 
has some capacity to act as the common agent of the Members. We think that this role should be 
enhanced. 
When it comes to honouring their transparency obligations, WTO Members seem more often to 
have placed the accent on their ‘right to divulge’, or not, and less on the consequence of this exercise 
of their discretion; that is, that others may be limited in their ‘right to know’ about measures affecting 
trade. Moreover, one should not underestimate the collective action problem that arises, even for large 
Members. Why should the U.S. incur the cost of procuring information through reverse notifications 
when all Members will benefit from the information thereby revealed? The U.S. has submitted 
extensive reverse notifications of Chinese and Indian subsidies, for example, but few other Members 
have the capacity to generate such analysis of another Member’s policies. And the U.S. in other 
similar occasions might have an incentive to keep similar information to itself rather than serving the 
general good with a reverse notification, or a detailed question in a committee. 
Given the missing incentives to notify, which are unlikely to change soon, one solution might be to 
cut through the trilemma by enabling a disinterested party to acquire and disseminate information as 
the “common agent” of all participants in the trading system. 
4.2 What happens already 
The WTO has multiple principals who are themselves agents in the trading system—160 Member 
governments, but also citizens, and hundreds of millions of traders. Sunshine as now practiced is not 
properly serving their agency, their ability to discipline other agents who may not be playing by the 
rules. Two things are needed, which can only come from a common agent: active efforts to increase 
the amount of information available, and then to make that information widely available in a useful 
way. The move towards increasing the role of the common agent (the WTO Secretariat) is the 
(implicit) response to the failure to submit notifications by WTO Members.  
The core of each TPR report is based on the notifications from Members, but each report builds 
from a far wider range of information. The Secretariat collects data from official sources 
(questionnaires to Member under review) and non-official sources, including from other international 
organizations, media reports, and NGOs. To ensure accuracy, the Secretariat seeks verification of the 
data from non-official sources when discussing the draft of its report with the Member (WTO, 2011a, 
para. 180).  
Members created a new mechanism in response to the Great Recession that began in 2008. After 
the G-20 asked the WTO and other international organizations to monitor their collective commitment 
to avoid protectionism, the WTO began issuing periodic crisis monitoring reports, a novel extension of 
the mandate of the TPRB (WTO, 2012). The Director-General claimed that he had the authority under 
the WTO agreements to conduct the crisis monitoring, but Members only formalized this role in 
December 2011 (WTO, 2011b). Members had discovered that the periodic Secretariat reports were 
factual and useful, especially for smaller Members who could not begin to generate such data on their 
own, and that the Secretariat was not trying to add to the dispute settlement system through the back 
door (Wolfe, 2012).
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There is only so much that a Secretariat can do though. It too faces search costs and its powers of 
naming and shaming are limited.  
4.3 A Look into the Future 
Transparency for other WTO Members and for individual traders cannot have the same content. 
Irrespective whether we talk customs matters, technical barriers to trade, or government procurement, 
the ‘intensity’ of information should be different. Traders do not possess sophisticated bureaucracies 
that will ‘process’ supplied information for them. The level of ‘dis-aggregation’ should be different 
when information is meant to accustom traders to trade policies. This is an area where the WTO can 
substantially improve, and it will be a very welcome accompanying measure to ‘single windows’ that 
should, if possible, find application across the spectrum of trade policies. We see a role for the WTO 
as the common agent to supply information when it is under-supplied. In this respect, we would like to 
see two innovations that would support the changing role that the WTO ought to play in international 
trade relations.  
First, we would like to see a more proactive WTO when it comes to collecting information and 
making it available, which would require some internal re-organization of the staff, and probably some 
additional investment as well. The inadequate notifications by WTO Members can be partially 
mitigated by giving the Secretariat increased scope, and resources, to act as the common agent of 
Members in assembling information that ought to have been notified. This authority to try fill the gaps 
in the information provided by Members should be subject to the principle that such information 
should be subject to “verification” by Members. For example, the Secretariat could keep a data set 
with the number of notifications in general and by agreement for each WTO Member say for a 5 year 
period. If in any year, a given WTO Member is below the ‘mean’, then WTO officials should target it 
on priority basis. In similar vein, if important developments happen (signing a new regional 
agreement; acceding to a plurilateral agreement; end of transitional period etc.), and there is no 
‘upwards’ deviation from the ‘mean’, then again this WTO Member should be reviewed on priority 
basis. 
Second, one area worthy of special attention by the Secretariat as common agent is regional or 
preferential trade agreements (PTA). The WTO is not the only game in town, since over 500 regional 
trade schemes have been established, and some mega regional schemes are about to be established. 
We know little, if anything at all, about the workings of those schemes after the ‘train has left the 
station’, and the review by the CRTA has been completed. And yet, these agreements are full of 
TBT+, SPS+, GPA+ disciplines, which at least potentially affect each and every WTO Member and 
trader. A bridge must be built to ensure a steady flow of information about the operation of PTAs. 
Such a transparency and dissemination exercise matters for PTA participants themselves, because 
most such agreements have weak institutional structures, without strong notification obligations, and 
no Secretariat to process notifications in any case. 
5. Sunshine needs a stronger lens 
Justice Brandeis might have overstated the ‘efficiency’ of sunshine, but he certainly did not overstate 
the case for transparency. The work of Nobel prize winning economists (Akerloff, Stiglitz, Spence, 
Williamson) demonstrates that information should be treated like all other scarce commodities. It is 
costly, and not equally accessible. Transparency obligations aim to equalize conditions of procuring 
information across all trading nations and their traders, assuming of course fair play by all. In the case 
of international trade, where (almost) all government intervention affects the trade outcome in one 
way or the other, the quest for equalizing access to information is also a quest for ‘efficient’ access to 
information. It does not help traders much to know that information is available, if they do not also 
know where it is available. We see a need to strengthen the existing disciplines, but also, inevitably so, 
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a greater role for the WTO to act as a lens, helping to shine a more focused light where it is needed, 
enabling many more actors to have the information to discipline the efforts of the few to restrict trade 
at the expense of the many. It is high time that the WTO acts =in line with its original mandate, the 
forgotten ‘inconvenient’ truth: it is a government-to-government contract that greatly affects the lives 
of individuals. In this vein, our recommendations suggest a more active role for the WTO Secretariat, 
and a wider use of the information provided. As more developing countries come to participate in 
global value chains, and micro-firms in all countries participate in rapidly expanding internet-enabled 
trade, a much wider group of economic actors count, and the problem of information asymmetry will 
become exponentially more complex. No PTA can create the necessary apparatus; WTO can, but only 
with an expanded role for the Secretariat as common agent collecting, aggregating and disseminating 
trade policy intelligence. 
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